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1 Question 1.
1. The maximum problem is:
max
C1,C2
L =
C1−θ1
1− θ +
1
1 + ρ
C1−θ2
1− θ − λ
[
P1C1 + P2C2 −W
]
. (1)
The First Order Conditions are:
∂L
∂C1
= C−θ1 − λP1 = 0; (2)
∂L
∂C2
=
1
1 + ρ
C−θ2 − λP2 = 0; (3)
∂L
∂λ
= P1C1 + P2C2 −W = 0
= C2 =
W
P2
− P1
P2
C1. (4)
Dividing (2) by (3) yields(
C1
C2
)−θ
=
1
(1 + ρ)
P1
P2
; (5)
and, solving for C1,
C1 = C2
[
(1 + ρ)
P2
P1
] 1
θ
. (6)
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Substituting (6) in (4) yields
C2 =
W
P2
− P1
P2
C2
[
(1 + ρ)
P2
P1
] 1
θ
=
W
P2
− C2(1 + ρ) 1θ
(
P2
P1
) 1−θ
θ
=
W/P2
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
θ (P2/P1)
1−θ
θ
. (7)
Substituting (7) in (6), gives
C1 =
W/P2
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
θ (P2/P1)
1−θ
θ
[
(1 + ρ)
P2
P1
] 1
θ
. (8)
2. Dividing (8) by (7) yields:
C1
C2
=
[
(1 + ρ)
P2
P1
] 1
θ
. (9)
Taking logs gives:
ln
C1
C2
=
(
1
θ
)[
ln
(
P2
P1
)
+ ln(1 + ρ)
]
. (10)
Finally, the derivative w.r.t. (P2/P1) defines the (positive) elasticity:
− ∂ ln(C1/C2)
∂P1/P2
=
∂ ln(C1/C2)
∂P2/P1
=
1
θ
. (11)
3. Consider ∆t = (t0 + ε) − (t0 − ε). At (t0 − ε), consumption falls by ∆c,
leading to an increase in savings of ∆s that will increase c at (t0 + ε)
by the instantaneous rate of return r(t). If the individual is maximising
its utility, the impact of this change must be zero. Let us define cb the
consumption before t0, and ca the consumption after t0. Then, utilities in
the two moments are defined as:
Ub = u
′(cb)∆c; (12)
Ua = (1/2)u
′(ca)∆c e[r(t)−g−n]∆t. (13)
Imposing
Ub = Ua
u′(cb)∆c = (1/2)u′(ca)∆c e[r(t)−g−n]∆t, (14)
and letting ∆t→ 0, we obtain
u′(cb) = (1/2)u′(ca). (15)
Hence, will jump down at t0. Intuitively, households will consume more
before t0, as they have an incentive not to save so as to avoid the wealth
confiscation.
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4. In this case, each household’s behaviour will not affect the amount of
wealth that is confiscated: a predetermined amount will be confiscated
at t0, and households’ optimisation will take this into account. Hence,
individuals will keep smoothing consumption over time, and there will be
no discontinuous jump in consumption at t0.
2 Question 2.
1. The assumptions of the Ramsey Model are:
(a) The production function Y = F (K,AL) has the same properties as
in the Solow Model;
(b) Markets are competitive, thus the (symmetric) firms will have profits
pi = 0;
(c) Households’ utility is given by
U = B
∫ ∞
t=0
eβtu(c(t))dt, (16)
where B ≡ A(0)1−θ L(0)H , β ≡ ρ− n− (1− θ)g.
(d) Trasversality condition:
lim
s→∞ e
−R(s)K(s)
H
≥ 0. (17)
(e) Utility cannot grow boundlessly:
ρ− n− (1− θ)g > 0. (18)
2. Since in this case H = 1, L(0) = 1, A(t) = 1, the optimisation problem is
given by:
max
c(t)
L =
∫ ∞
t=0
e(n−ρ)t ln(c(t))dt− λ
[∫ ∞
t=0
e−R(t)+ntc(t)dt−W (t)
]
. (19)
The First Order Condition for c(t) is:
∂L
∂c(t)
= c(t)−1e(n−ρ)t − λent−R(t) = 0. (20)
Taking logs yields
− ln c(t)− ρt− lnλ−R(t) = 0
− ln c(t)− ρt− lnλ−
∫ t
τ=0
r(τ)dt = 0, (21)
and deriving w.r.t. t and rearranging terms yields
˙c(t)
c(t)
= r(t)− ρ. (22)
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Since a Cobb-Douglas production function implies r(t) = f ′(k) = αk(t)α−1,
the dynamics of consumption given in (20) is
˙c(t)
c(t)
= αk(t)α−1 − ρ = 0 iff k?(t) =
(
ρ
α
) 1
α−1
. (23)
The dynamics of capital is
˙k(t) = f(k(t))− c(t)− (n+ g)k(t), (24)
which, in our case, becomes
˙k(t) = k(t)α − c(t)− nk(t) = 0 iff c?(t) = k(t)α − nk(t). (25)
3. Questo esercizio verrà ripreso prima del primo parziale.
3 Question 3.
The dynamics of the economy are described by:
˙c(t)
c(t)
=
r(t)− ρ− θg [−δ]
θ
= 0 (26)
iff r(t) ≡ f ′(k?(t)) = ρ+ θg [+δ];
˙k(t) = f(k(t))− c(t)− (n+ g [+δ])k(t) = 0 (27)
iff c?(t) = f(k(t))− (n+ g [+δ])k(t).
Method: describe how and why the change shifts the curves. Thence, find the
new equilibrium. Remember that k cannot jump discontinuously, since it is
determined by the history of the economy.
1. If g ↓, then the level of c consistent with ˙k(t) = 0 is higher for a given k.
Hence, the locus of ˙k(t) = 0 ↑. After the fall in g, the level of f ′(k(t))
consistent with ˙c(t)/c(t) = 0 is lower. Since f ′′(k(t)) < 0, k(t) ↑. Hence,
the locus of ˙c(t)/c(t) = 0 ↑.
At t0, when the change happens, c jumps upwards to the new saddle
path, and the economy converges at the new equilibrium, with k?N > k
?
and c?N > c
?.
2. If f(k(t)) ↓ (and f ′(k(t)) ↓), then the level of c consistent with ˙k(t) = 0
is lower for a given k. Hence, the locus of ˙k(t) = 0 ↓. After the fall in
f(k(t)) (and f ′(k(t))), the level of k(t) consistent with ˙c(t)/c(t) = 0 is
lower. Hence, the locus of ˙c(t)/c(t) = 0 ↓.
At t0, when the change happens, c jumps downwards to the new saddle
path, and the economy converges at the new equilibrium, with k?N < k
?
and c?N < c
?.
3. If δ > 0, then the level of c consistent with ˙k(t) = 0 is lower for a given
k. Hence, the locus of ˙k(t) = 0 ↓. After the rise in δ, the level of f ′(k(t))
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consistent with ˙c(t)/c(t) = 0 is higher. Since f ′′(k(t)) < 0, k(t) ↓. Hence,
the locus of ˙c(t)/c(t) = 0 ↓.
At t0, when the change happens, c jumps downwards to the new saddle
path, and the economy converges at the new equilibrium, with k?N < k
?
and c?N < c
?.
4. The fact that, now, r(t) = (1 − τ)f ′(k(t)) does not affect the ˙k(t) = 0
locus. On the other hand, the the locus of ˙c(t)/c(t) = 0 ↓.
(a) If the tax is unanticipated (i.e. the change happens at t0), c jumps
up to the new saddle path, and the economy converges at the new
equilibrium, with k?N < k
? and c?N < c
?.
(b) If the tax is announced at t0 and implemented at t1,
• At t0, c jumps up to a new point A that is in between the current
saddle path and the future one. At A, though, c is too high
to maintain the capital stock at k?, so k ↓. At this point, the
dynamics of the system are still governed by the original ˙c(t) = 0
locus, so c rises further, as the economy moves north-west.
• At t1 the tax is implemented, and the system is governed by the
new ˙c(t) = 0 locus. Thus c begins falling, as the economy moves
on the new saddle path to the new equilibrium, with k?N < k
?
and c?N < c
?.
5. The dynamic equations of the economy are the same as above, but now
the change is temporary, hence the economy eventually goes back to the
original ˙c(t) = 0 locus.
(a) If the tax is unanticipated (i.e. the change happens at t0 and lasts
until t1),
• At t0, c jumps up towards the new saddle path to some point A
(it does not reach the new saddle path, since households know
that the tax will end). The system is governed by the new locus
of ˙c(t) = 0. At this point, c is too high and begins falling together
with k. Eventually the economy crosses the ˙k(t) = 0 locus, and
k starts rising again.
• At t1, the tax policy is withdrawn and the economy is governed
again by the original ˙c(t) = 0 locus. The economy then is on the
old saddle path and converges to the original equilibrium.
(b) If the tax is anticipated (i.e. the announcement is made at t0, the
change happens at t0 and lasts until t1),
• At t0, c jumps up to a new point A that is in between the current
saddle path and the future one. At A, though, c is too high
to maintain the capital stock at k?, so k ↓. At this point, the
dynamics of the system are still governed by the original ˙c(t) = 0
locus, so c rises further, as the economy moves north-west.
• At t1 the tax is implemented, and the economy is governed by
the new ˙c(t) = 0 locus, so that k keeps falling and c stops rising
and begins to fall too. At some point the economy crosses the
˙k(t) = 0 locus, and k starts rising again.
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• At t2 the tax is withdrawn, the system is again governed by the
original ˙c(t) = 0 locus, so that the economy then is on the old
saddle path and converges to the original equilibrium.
6. n ↓ implies that the ˙k(t) = 0 locus ↑. The policy is announced at t0, and
implemented at t1 until t2.
• At t0, c jumps up to a point such A. Since the system is still governed
by the old dynamics, now c is too high, and k falls.
• At t1 the policy is implemented and, since now c is too low, thus it
rises together with k. Eventually, the economy will cross the ˙c(t) = 0
and c will begin to fall again.
• At t2 the policy is withdrawn, the system is again governed by the
original dynamics, so that the economy is on the old saddle path and
converges to the original equilibrium.
4 Question 4 (Optional).
For a constant G(t) = G (N.B. without loss of generality we will derive the
dynamics of consumption with the functions given in Exercise (2)), the new
optimisation problem is given by:
max
c(t)
L =
∫ ∞
t=0
e(n−ρ)t ln(c(t) +G)dt− λ
[∫ ∞
t=0
e−R(t)+ntc(t)dt−W (t)
]
. (28)
The First Order Condition for c(t) is:
∂L
∂c(t)
= [c(t) +G]−1e(n−ρ)t − λent−R(t) = 0. (29)
Taking logs yields
− ln[c(t) +G]− ρt− lnλ−R(t) = 0 (30)
and deriving w.r.t. t and rearranging terms yields
˙c(t)
c(t)−G = r(t)− ρ. (31)
Thus, the (general) condition for constant consumption is still given by r(t) ≡
f ′(k?(t)) = ρ+ θg. Changes in G will affect the level of c, but will not shift the
˙c(t) = 0 locus.
The capital accumulation equation is given by ˙k(t) = f(k(t))− c(t)−G(t)−
(n + g)k(t). Suppose the economy starts on a balanced growth path. At some
time t0, G increases to some level GH . The ˙k(t) = 0 locus shifts down by
(GH − G). At time t1, when government purchases return to G, the ˙k(t) = 0
locus shifts up to its original place and c jumps back to the original equilibrium.
This is determined by the fact that G enters the utility function, so even if
households know that the change is only temporary, c must jump down by no
less than (GH−G). Otherwise, the economy could not reach equilibrium again.
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